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WILDLIFE, WATER QUALITY, AND THE PUBLIC TRUST
DOCTRINE: A MEANS OF ENFORCING AGRICULTURAL
NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION MANAGEMENT PLANS
VERONIQUE JARRELL-KING*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Throughout the nation, entire amphibian populations are experiencing reproductive and developmental defects that threaten
their survival.' This damage is attributable to the runoff of herbicides, such as atrazine, from agricultural fields, which have managed to successfully evade regulation under the Clean Water Act
(CWA). 2 Agricultural nonpoint source pollution in the nation's waterways not only affects amphibians, but also other wildlife species
residing in the waters. 3 This, in turn, impacts humans and other
* V6ronique Jarrell-King is a J.D. and Master of Environmental Law and Pol-

icy Candidate, 2012, at Vermont Law School. She received her B.A. in 2006 from
the University of Colorado.
1. Tyrone B. Hayes et al., Hermaphroditic,Demasculinized Frogs After Exposure to
the HerbicideAtrazine at Low Ecologically Relevant Doses, 99 PROC. OF THE NAT'L ACAD.
OF SCIS. OF THE U.S. 5476, 5479 (2002) (discussing how current levels of atrazine
application to agricultural areas could impair reproductive function in amphibians
and lead to population decline and extinction).
2. F. Orton et al., Effects of Nitrate and Atrazine on LarvalDevelopment and Sexual
Differentiation in the Northern Leopard FrogRana Pipiens, 25 ENVrTL. ToxicoLoov &
CHEMISTRY 65, 65 (2006) (discussing possible link between amphibian population
decline and agricultural pollutants, such as atrazine); see also Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. § 1251 (1994) (providing goals and policy of Clean Water Act).
3. See, e.g., B. Lal, Pesticide-InducedReproductive Dysfunction in Indian Fishes, 33
FISH PHYSIOLOGY & BIOCHEMISTRY 455, 455 (2007) (noting studies have shown pesticides to effect or damage gonadal development, fertilization, fecundity, and
lower hormonal levels in Indian fishes); Santi Mahiosa et al., A Review of the Effects of
Agricultural and Industrial Contamination on the Ebro Delta Biota and Wildlife, 71
ENVTL. MONITORING & ASSESSMENT 187, 191 (2001) (finding massive use of herbicides has caused loss in biodiversity, greatly damaging diving ducks and coot populations); Jeremy David Rouse et al., Nitrogen Pollution: An Assessment of its Threat to
Amphibian Survival, 107 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 799, 799 (1999) (finding nitrogen
concentrations near Great Lakes sufficient to cause death and developmental ab-

(1)
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4
species reliant upon the affected wildlife as a source of food.
Thus, in response to the CWA's failure to adequately regulate agricultural nonpoint source pollution, citizens should look to the public trust doctrine as a means of requiring state agencies to more
effectively address nonpoint source pollution and reduce its detrimental effects on wildlife.
The public trust doctrine provides members of the public with
a means of ensuring the government protects the public's interest
in common resources-resources held in a trust by the government
for the people.5 One of the greatest strengths of the public trust
doctrine is it "can sometimes give greater recognition to public interests at times when legislatures are under excessive pressure by
special interest lobbyists."6 Because agricultural interest groups
have developed into such a powerful force, they have the potential
to sway state agencies and effectively avoid the voluntary nonpoint
source pollution regulations set forth in the CWA.7 As a result,
many legislatures and agencies face excessive pressure when attempting to implement agricultural nonpoint source pollution control plans under § 319 of the CWA. 8 Through the public trust
doctrine, however, citizens have the potential to challenge an
agency's failure to consider the public's interest in wildlife when
the agency develops and reviews nonpoint source pollution control
plans, even in the face of strong political pressure from agricultural
lobbyists.9
This article examines the potential use of the public trust doctrine by members of the public to require state and local agencies
to consider the public's interest in wildlife protection and water
quality dependent public trust uses when the agency determines

normalities in amphibians in addition to adversely affecting other animals in
aquatic ecosystems).
4. See Lal, supra note 3, at 455 (discussing impacts on Indian Fishes); Mahiosa,
supra note 3, 187 (discussing impacts on diving ducks and coot populations);
Rouse, supra note 3, at 799 (discussing impacts on amphibians).
5. Anna R.C. Caspersen, The Public Trust Doctrine and the Impossibility of "Takings"by Wildlife, 23 B.C. ENVTL. Ave. L. REv. 357, 358 (1996) (indicating public trust
doctrine stresses duty to protect and preserve natural resources).
6. Ralph W. Johnson, Water Pollution and the Public Trust Doctrine, 19 ENvrL. L.
485, 511 (1989) (explaining advantages and disadvantages of public trust
doctrine).
7. See David Zaring, Agriculture, Nonpoint Source Pollution, and Regulatory Control:
The Clean Water Act's Bleak Present and Future, 20 HARv. ENVrL. L. REv. 515, 54243

(1996) (suggesting outside influences affecting implementation of CWA).
8. Johnson, supra note 6, at 511 (describing pressures asserted on legislative
process).
9. For further discussion, see infra Part V and notes 144-157.
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whether to implement the § 319 nonpoint source regulation.' 0
Specifically, the article explores whether the public can use the
public trust doctrine as a means to require state agencies to better
regulate agricultural nonpoint source pollution that damages the
public's interest in protecting its wildlife.'" The public trust doctrine varies in each state depending on the extent its common law
evolved to address water quality and wildlife protection; therefore,
California has the greatest potential to use the public trust doctrine
to urge the enforcement of nonpoint source pollution regulation.1 2
There is no reason, however, the public trust doctrine could not be
utilized in other states in the future if the common law foundations
allow for it.'1
Part II of this article provides background on the public trust
doctrine, and focuses on the public's interest in wildlife and public
trust uses that depend on water quality protection.14 Part III addresses the detrimental effects of agricultural pollution on wildlife
and water quality; specifically, the potential fatal effects of the herbicide atrazine on amphibian development and reproduction.1 5 In
Part IV, this article provides the background and shortcomings of
§§ 208 and 319 of the CWA and explains how those sections have
led to ineffective regulatory controls over nonpoint source pollution in the United States.1 6 Lastly, Part V discusses the potential to
use the public trust doctrine as a means of ensuring state and local
government agencies fulfill their duties in considering the public's
interests when developing and implementing § 319 nonpoint
source pollution control plans.' 7

10. For further discussion, see infra Part V and notes 144-157.
11. For further discussion, see infra Part V and notes 144-157.
12. See Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine Cnty., 658 P.2d 709,
719 (Cal. 1983) (describing evolution of public trust in California in tandem with
public values); Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Grp., Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d
588, 595-96 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (describing scope of public trust in California).
13. See infra note 156 for an overview of states with common law foundations
for wildlife and water quality protection.
14. For further exploration of the origin of the public trust doctrine, see infra
Part II and notes 18-80.
15. For further discussion of the damage pollutants caused to the environment, see infra Part III and notes 81-107.
16. For further discourse of how some sections of the CWA have not achieved
their desired effects, see infra Part IV and notes 108-143.
17. For further examination of the public trust doctrine's potential, see infra
Part V and notes 144-157.
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PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE

[T] he public trust is more than an affirmation of state
power to use public property for public purposes. It is an
affirmation of the duty of the state to protect the people's
common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands and tidelands, surrendering that right of protection only in rare
cases when the abandonment of that right is consistent
with the purposes of the trust.' 8
The public trust doctrine creates a legal duty in the states to
hold natural resources in a trust for the benefit of the public, and
protect and preserve the resources for future generations.' 9 The
strength of the doctrine stems from the fact that private citizens can
sue a government agency and demand the agency recognize the
public's interests as a whole when making decisions that impact
those interests. 2 0 The doctrine has been recognized as encompassing a diverse breadth of interests, such as the submerged lands of
navigable waterways, the value of entire ecological systems, and the
water quality impacting public trust uses. 21
The concept of the public trust arose under Roman law, where
natural resources, "such as air, water, and wildlife," were viewed as
commonly owned by the public, as they were items no individual
could own in their entirety.2 2 The public trust notion was subse18. Nat'1 Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine Cnty., 658 P.2d 709, 724
(Cal. 1983) (describing duties of state as trustee of public trust).
19. Caspersen, supra note 5, at 358 (discussing public trust doctrine's influence on society at large).
20. See Deborah G. Musiker et al., The Public Trust and Parens PatriaeDoctrines:
Protecting Wildlife in Uncertain Political Times, 16 PUB. LAND L. REv. 87, 95 (1995)
(noting citizens may seek relief in court when agencies fail to consider public trust
interests). California is a prime example of a state that allows citizens to bring an
independent action against an agency under the public trust doctrine when an
agency fails to recognize the public trust when performing their duties. See Ctr. for
Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Grp., Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 601 (Cal. Ct. App.
2008). In other states, however, public trust enforcement claims are raised as part
of another proceeding, not as their own cause of action. See In re Steuart Transp.
Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 39-40 (E.D. Va. 1980) (bringing case for damages and
cleanup costs and subsequently raising public trust doctrine claim).
21. 1Il. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 455 (1892) (noting navigable waters
and soil below are held in public trust); Nat'lAudubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 719 (recognizing importance of water quality in protecting public interest in scenic and ecological value of Mono Lake).
22. Caspersen, supra note 5, at 363 (illustrating Roman law's influence on
idea of common ownership under public trust doctrine); see also Greer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 522 (1896), overruled hy Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322
(1979) (discussing commonly owned property could include animals and ferae
naturae which were believed to belong to all citizens of state).
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quently recognized under the common law of England, whereby
the king retained ownership of the lands and granted access to the
public for the purpose of grazing, hunting, foraging, and fishing.2 3
In essence, the king held and protected the resources for the public
to use.2 4
The public trust doctrine resurfaced in the United States when
Americans began to realize the nation's resources were finite and
public access to such resources needed to be preserved. 2 5 In the
seminal case on the public trust doctrine, Illinois CentralRailroad Co.
v. Illinois (Illinois Central),26 the Supreme Court of the United States
determined Illinois held the shore of Lake Michigan in public trust,
and thus could transfer the shore land to a private owner only if
Illinois retained discretion and control over the land.27 By virtue of
its sovereignty, the Court deemed the State to hold both the navigable waters and the soils below in a trust for the people of the
State.2 8
Following Illinois Central,courts have extended the public trust
doctrine to other uses such as boating, rafting, and hunting, and to
other resources such as wildlife habit, water, groundwater, wetlands, and areas of dry sand. 29 Most importantly, the public trust
doctrine continues to evolve; it constantly expands and reshapes
based on the values and needs of the citizens of each state.3 0

23. Caspersen, supra note 5, at 364-65 (documenting origins of public trust
doctrine).
24. Id. (describing how states inherited notion of public trust from king).
25. Id. at 365-66 (discussing eventual progression of public trust doctrine
from public access focus to role of preservation).
26. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
27. Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 453 (noting only time state could relinquish
duty to exercise management and control over public trust property was when doing so was in public's best interest or when disposing of property did not impair
public's remaining trust interests).
28. Id. at 455 (explaining common public interest in maintaining ownership
of navigable waters).
29. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 365-66 (N.J.
1984) (recognizing public interest in dry sand areas); Ctr. for Biological Diversity,
Inc. v. FPL Grp., Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 595-600 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (recognizing interests in tidelands, navigable waters, and more); see also Musiker, supra note
20, at 92 (noting courts' broad interpretation of public trust doctrine).
30. Mary Christina Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to Safeguard the Environmentfor Present and Future Generations(Part I): Ecological Realism and
the Need for a Paradigm Shift, 39 ENVrL. L. 43, 80 (2009) (questioning elasticity of
public trust doctrine to effectuate needs of ever-changing society).
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"The heart of the public trust doctrine, however it may be articulated, is that it imposes limits and obligations on governments."3 1 Each branch of the government is allocated specific
duties in order to ensure the public's interests are recognized and
protected. 32 In a sense, the legislature is the trustee of the trust
because it enacts the laws of the state that will best protect the public trust, and the executive branch is the agent.33 As the agent, the
executive branch, through its state and federal agencies, has the
duty to enforce the trust obligations set forth by each state legislature. 3 4 A state agency has "an affirmative duty to take the public
trust into account in the planning and allocat[ing] of ... resources,
and to protect public trust uses whenever feasible" to minimize
harm.3 5 In addition, once a state agency approves a plan affecting a
public trust resource, the agency has a duty to continue supervising
the use of the resource and the power to reconsider any past decisions inconsistent or contrary to the needs of the public.3 6
The judicial branch, however, is the "ultimate guardian of the
trust," protecting the public's rights in public trust resources.3 7
When using the judicial branch to protect their rights, citizens must
overcome two primary hurdles: a valid cause of action and standing.38 In California, if an agency fails to perform its duties or consider the public interest in making a decision, the public may bring
31. Charles F. Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 U.C.
DAVis L. REv. 269, 284 (1980-1981) (discussing public trust doctrine in limiting
federal power); see also Ill. Cent. R.R, 146 U.S. at 454 (opining state was restricted
from turning land held in public trust over to private company because it was
required to hold for public); In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D.
Va. 1980) (finding because no individual citizen could recover for loss of waterfowl, it was "right and the duty" of state to protect and preserve public's interest in
wildlife resources for them).
32. Wood, supra note 30, at 75-77 (explaining duties of government
branches).
33. Id. at 75 (illustrating role of government branches in public trust); see also
Greer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 533-34 (1896)), overruled by Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (describing role of legislature).
34. Wood, supra note 30, at 75 (explaining duty of executive branch to enforce legislature).
35. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine Cnty., 658 P.2d 709, 728
(Cal. 1983) (illustrating role of state agency in protecting public interest).
36. Id. (describing supervising power of state agency over public trust
resource).
37. Wood, supra note 30, at 75 (explaining role ofjudiciary in protecting public rights); Gary D. Meyers, Variation on a Theme: Expanding the Public Trust Doctrine
to Include Protection of Wildlife, 19 ENvrL. L. 723, 731 (1989) (describing impact of
judicial branch on public trust resources).
38. See discussion infra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
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an action to enforce the trust and compel that agency to perform
its duties.39 Though many states do not offer a public trust enforcement cause of action, the public may raise the claim as part of a
proceeding.40 Once there is a valid cause of action, some courts,
such as those in Hawaii, Illinois, and California, have granted citizens standing to enforce the doctrine in certain instances, while
other refuse to do the same.4 1 Once these barriers are surmounted, members of the public benefit when courts perceive
agency actions-actions which restrict public uses or place them in
the hands of a private party's self interest-with "considerable skepticism." 4 2 The public trust places a fiduciary obligation on the
agency to protect the public trust resources, and when the agency
fails to do so, courts will review public trust cases with "meaningful
judicial scrutiny."4 3
39. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Grp., Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588,
602-03 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (explaining rights of citizens to bring action in California); Musiker, supra note 20, at 96 (describing process for citizens bringing action
in California).
40. In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 39-40 (E.D. Va. 1980) (allowing
public trust enforcement as part of proceeding); Owsichek v. Alaska Guide Licensing & Control Bd., 763 P.2d 488, 491 (Alaska 1988) (permitting public trust
claim); Kootenai Envtl. Alliance v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085,
1094-95 (Idaho 1983) (permitting public trust cause of action). In these states, the
public trust doctrine is often raised in cases brought before the court for permit
compliance and validity, tort damages, and questions on the constitutionality of a
statute. See supra.

41. Sierra Club v. Dep't of Transp., 167 P.3d 292, 313 (Haw. 2007) (finding
even though member of public must still meet three-part standing test, as environmental plaintiff their injury need not be particularized because harm to plaintiffs
environmental interests may be sufficient for standing). This court also noted a
less rigorous standing requirement was available for environmental plaintiffs
under the Hawai'i Constitution Article XI, § 9. Id. Similarly, the Supreme Court
of Illinois reasoned that to ensure the public trust doctrine's validity, members of
the public must be granted standing, noting "[t]o tell them that they must wait
upon governmental action is often an effectual denial of the right for all time."
Paepcke v. Pub. Bldg. Comm'n of Chicago, 263 N.E.2d 11, 18 (Ill. 1970); see also
Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine Cnty., 658 P.2d 709, 716 n.I1
(Cal. 1983) (concluding plaintiffs have standing to sue for violations of public
trust); Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 600 (explaining there is no
reason in principle why members of public should be denied standing to maintain
appropriate action in enforcing public trust in wildlife).
42. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective
JudicialIntervention, 68 MicH. L. REv. 471, 490 (1970) (explaining courts' skepti-

cism toward agency actions).
43. Mary Christina Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of Government to Safeguard the Environmentfor Present and Future Generations (PartII): Instilling a Fiduciary

Obligation in Governance, 39 ENvrL. L. 91, 112 (2009) (explaining major difference
between agency's statutory duty and trust duty is courts give greater deference to
agency's decision in statutory context). In a trust context, however, courts scrutinize the agency's decision to determine if the agency acted appropriately as trustee. Id.
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The Public Trust in Wildlife

The public trust doctrine has long recognized wildlife as a protected resource, an interest that has expanded as public needs and
perceptions shifted. 4 4 Recently, the California Court of Appeals
recognized wildlife as a "natural resource [] of inestimable value to
the community as a whole." 45 With the expansion of the public's
interest in wildlife, the public trust doctrine can be used to protect
wildlife resources from the state legislatures, agencies, and administrative personnel who fail to perform their duties in protecting the
public's interest in preserving wildlife.46 Specifically, states have the
duty to regulate and conserve wildlife, in their sovereign capacity, as
trustees of wildlife for the benefit of the people.47
In Greer v. Connecticut (Greer) ,48 the Supreme Court held the
citizens in their "collective sovereign capacity" owned the wildlife
within a state's borders, and the state has the responsibility to control the wildlife "as a trust for the benefit of the people."49 In essence, the Court adopted the public trust doctrine by placing a duty
on the state to protect the public's interest in wildlife under the
sovereign ownership theory.50 Even though Hughes v. Oklahoma
44. Musiker, supra note 20, at 92 (explaining shift in perceptions toward public trust doctrine); see, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (clarifying traditional public trust rights were related to navigation, commerce, and
fishing before court extended rights to tidelands); Nat'1 Audubon Socy, 658 P.2d at
719 (recognizing evolution of public trust based on shifts in public values, which
are now focused on preserving tidelands in their natural state as public use); see
also Ctr.for Biological Diversity, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 597 (explaining elements of public trust doctrine); Meyers, supra note 37, at 729 (citing M. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION
OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAw 12 (1983)) (noting ownership of wildlife, like water,
historically has been treated as aspect of sovereignty); Musiker, supra note 20, at 91
(noting even though Illinois Central reviewed public trust in light of waterways, "the
core of the public trust doctrine applies more generally to wildlife").
45. Cir.for BiologicalDiversity, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 599 (recognizing public trust
doctrine encompasses protection of undomesticated birds and wildlife).
46. Musiker, supra note 20, at 109 (explaining public trust doctrine can protect wildlife resources from state legislatures, agencies, and administrative personnel who fail to perform duties).
47. Id. at 88, 91-92 ("Like their ownership of the beds beneath navigable waterways, states own wildlife in their sovereign capacity and thereby have a public
trust duty to prevent impairment of this common resource").
48. 161 U.S. 519 (1896), overruled by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322
(1979).
49. Id. at 529 (holding wildlife within state's borders was owned by citizens in
their "collective sovereign capacity" to be exercised by state as trust for public
benefit).
50. Musiker, supra note 20, at 93 (adopting public trust doctrine by placing
duty on state to protect public's interest in wildlife under sovereign ownership
theory).
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(Hughes)5' overruled Greer on the constitutionality of interstate
wildlife shipping, Hughes made "ample allowance for preserving...
the legitimate state concerns for conservation and protection of
wild animals underlying the 19th-century legal fiction of state
ownership." 52
This concept of the public trust in wildlife was further developed when the Commonwealth of Virginia sued the ship owner responsible for an oil spill in the Chesapeake Bay which killed
approximately 30,000 migratory birds in In re Steuart Transportation
Co..5 The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia found that even though Virginia did not own the birds in
question, the State was still able to bring a claim against the ship
owner under the public trust doctrine.5 4 The court stated that
under the public trust doctrine, Virginia and the United States had
"the right and the duty to protect and preserve the public's interest
in natural wildlife resources. Such right does not derive from ownership of the resources but from a duty owing to the people."5 5 Essentially, Virginia acted on behalf of its citizens as the trustee of the
public trust.56
The California Court of Appeals arrived at a similar conclusion
in Centerfor BiologicalDiversity, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc.,5 7 when a wildlife protection group sued the owners and operators of wind tur-

bine electric generators for the destruction of thousands of birds in
violation of the public trust doctrine.5 8 The fatalities included "between 17,000 and 26,000 raptors-more than a thousand Golden
Eagles, thousands of hawks, and thousands of other raptors."5 9 The
California court resolved private parties have the right to insist state
agencies protect and preserve birds and other wildlife in their state

51. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
52. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 335-36 (explaining case made ample allowance for
preserving legitimate state concerns for conservation and protection of wild animals). To find a state interest in protecting wildlife, states have used theories such
as state ownership and their public trust duties, the public trust itself, or they simply adopt the concept of the public trust through a state's role as a trustee over
wildlife. See Musiker, supra note 20, at 94.
53. In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 39 (E.D. Va. 1980) (finding
even though Virginia did not own birds in question, it was able to bring claim
against ship owner).
54. Id. at 39-40 (explaining reasoning behind Virginia's action).
55. Id. at 40 (explaining why public trust doctrine applies).
56. Id. (explaining Virginia's duty to protect public's interests).
57. 83 Cal. Rptr, 3d 588 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
58. Id. at 592 (illustrating application of public trust regarding wildlife).
59. Id. (explaining devastation caused by turbine electric generators).
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because they are public trust resources.6 0 Moreover, as members of
the public, the court recognized private parties are entitled to bring
a public trust action to enforce the trust when an agency fails to
perform its duties under the trust.6'
C. Water Quality as an Essential Component of the Public Trust
Since its origin, the public trust doctrine has included the public's interest in navigable waterways.62 Recent cases have further expanded this coverage to include non-navigable waterways as well as
tidelands and water bodies for their ecological significance in their
natural states.6 3 Additionally, courts have long recognized the public trust doctrine as a tool to protect the public's interests in "fish,
wildlife, recreational, and environmental values"-uses that are
greatly impacted by the quality of the water. 64 In effect, by protecting these various uses of the water, water quality has become an
essential component of many public trust uses. 65 Such uses have
even expanded to encompass the preservation of public trust lands
for nontraditional recreational and ecological purposes, such as scientific study, scenic values, to maintain air purity, and to protect
wildlife nesting and feeding sites. 6 6

60. Id. at 603 (asserting individual right to compel agency action).
61. Id. at 601 (describing details of private right of action).
62. Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892) (noting lands under
navigable waters are held in trust for people of state for navigation, commerce,
and fishing).
63. See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (noting preservation of tidelands is important in protecting public's interest in ecological preservation); Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine Cnty., 658 P.2d 709, 711,
715, 720 (Cal. 1983) (recognizing scenic and ecological value of Mono Lake to be
in public interest, application of doctrine to non-navigable source streams, and
importance of water quality to system).
64. Johnson, supra note 6, at 498 (explaining how public trust encompasses
water quality); see Kootenai Envtl. Alliance v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d
1085, 1095 (Idaho 1983) (holding state agencies could consider effect of encroachments in water on "navigation, fish and wildlife habitat, aquatic life, recreation, aesthetic beauty and water quality," in relation to public trust doctrine);
United States v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 227 Cal. Rptr. 161, 150-52 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1986) (finding board was within its powers when it evaluated appropriation
permits by considering impact of water quality in protecting public's interest in
fish and wildlife resources).
65. Johnson, supra note 6, at 498 (noting essential nature of water quality
element).
66. Marks, 491 P.2d at 380 (explaining flexibility in notion of public uses to
incorporate public's changing needs); Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 719
(describing expanding definition of water quality dependent uses).
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In one of the earliest water pollution cases, People v. Gold Run

Ditch & Mining Co., 6 7 the Supreme Court of California recognized
that polluting public waters was "an unauthorized invasion of the
rights of the public to its navigation." 68 The case arose when Gold
Run Ditch and Mining Company discharged large amounts of rock
and sand from its mining operations into the river and bay, effectively filling the waters to the extent it hindered navigation. 69 As a
result, the court held the discharge was an encroachment on the
public's interest in navigable waters and the soil under the water,
which the state held as trustee for the benefit of the public in the
public trust.70
In 1971, the Supreme Court of California further recognized
the public trust doctrine covered the preservation of tidelands in
their natural state in Marks v. Whitney (Marks).71 The court stated
there is a public recognition of the importance of the "preservation
of [tidelands].

.

. in their natural state, so that they may serve as

ecological units for scientific study, as open space, and as environments which provide food and habitat for birds and marine life,
and which favorably affect the scenery and climate of the area."7 2
This tremendous expansion of public trust uses placed a great emphasis on preserving the water quality on which these uses rely.73
Twelve years later, in the en banc decision of National Audubon
Society v. Superior Court,7 4 the Supreme Court of California not only
held the public trust doctrine extended to non-navigable tributaries, but the court focused on the detrimental impact of low water
quality on public trust uses. 75 The Department of Power of the City
of Los Angeles was granted a permit to divert water from four of the
five non-navigable streams feeding Mono Lake; this diversion began

67. People v. Gold Run Ditch & Mining Co., 4 P. 1152 (Cal. 1884) (finding
discharge violated public trust doctrine).
68. Id. at 1155 (describing specific circumstances that led to finding infringement of public rights).
69. Id. at 144-45 (describing background to litigation).
70. Id. at 151-52 (holding that by allowing debris from hydraulic mining operation to discharge into stream, mining operation was infringing on public and
private rights despite longstanding custom).
71. Marks, 491 P.2d at 380 (holding legislation, patent, and public trust doctrine, covered tidelands at issue).
72. Id. (describing various uses of public trust waterways and myriad reasoning for holding such).
73. Johnson, supra note 6, at 496 (describing that while Marks did not specifically include water quality as public interest, it was included in public uses).
74. 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
75. Id. at 719, 721 (describing purpose and scope of public trust doctrine).
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to significantly disrupt the ecological balance of the lake.7 6 Observing there was "little doubt that both the scenic beauty and the ecological values of Mono Lake [were] imperiled" by the City's permit,
the court found that approving the diversion without considering
the public trust values would lead to the "needless destruction of
those values." 77 By increasing the salinity of the lake, the diversions
threatened to imperil the ecological value of the lake and destroy
the food sources and nesting sites for millions of local and migratory birds.7 8 The court also noted the decrease in the water level of
Mono Lake exposed gull rookeries to predators, forcing California
gulls to abandon their nesting sites.7 9 In effect, this decision revolved around an issue of water quality that caused substantial damage to the surrounding environment, and effectively injured the
public's interest in using the lake for recreation, scenic beauty, and
its ecological value.8 0
III.

CURRENT WATER QuALrrY AND WILDLIFE ISSUEs ARISING FROM
THE AGRICULTURAL POLLUTANT ATRAZINE

Agricultural Pollution and its Effects on Water Quality

A.

In recent decades, agricultural pollution has been recognized
for its tremendous detrimental impact on the water quality of our
nation's waters. 8 ' There are more than 330 million acres of land in
the United States used for agriculture. 8 2 Agricultural pollutants
such as pesticides, nutrients, sediment, and soluble salts commonly
end up in streams, rivers, and lakes due to leaching and runoff
from agricultural fields.8 3 The U.S. Department of Agriculture determined seventy-five percent of all pesticides used in the United
76. Id. at 711 (describing background to dispute).
77. Id. at 711-12 (supporting contention that public trust be considered in
case).

78. Id. at 715 (describing background and history of litigation).
79. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 716 (noting severe enviornmental impact
issues presented by case).
80. Id. (describing in particular, grave toll taken on California gull and water
levels).
81. Robert W. Adler, Water Quality and Agriculture:Assessing Alternative Futures,
25 ENVIRONS ENVrL. L. & POL'YJ. 77, 77-78 (2002) (discussing history of modern
water pollution with regards to agricultural pollution).
82. Agriculture, U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/owow -keep/
NPS/agriculture.html (last updated Feb. 10, 2010) (providing background for fact
sheets and reports).
83. JOHN D. SUrrON, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., WATER QUALITY AND AGRICULTURE
STATUS, CONDITIONS, AND TRENDS 7 (July 1997), available at http://www.nrcs.usda.

gov/Internet/FSEDOCUMENTS/nrcsl43_012448.pdf
to detailed report).
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States are for agricultural purposes, seventy percent of which are
herbicides. 4 Sometimes these pesticides turn up in surface and
ground water at rates exceeding United States health standards. 5
Current farming practices amplify these problems by encouraging
farmers to use excessive amounts of agricultural chemicals and
farm in "environmentally-sensitive areas" in an effort to increase the
output of each farm.8 6
B.

Agricultural Pollution and its Effects on Wildlife

Agricultural pollution affects not only the quality of the nation's water, but also the wildlife that depend on the water, which
makes agriculture a "leading cause of species endangerment and
extinction."8 7 Between 1992 and 2001, a United States Geological
Survey found pesticide concentrations exceeded the water-quality
benchmarks necessary to sustain "aquatic life and . . . fish-eating

wildlife in more than half of the streams with substantial agricultural and urban areas in their watersheds." 8
Furthermore,
"[a]gricultural streams had concentrations that exceeded one or
more benchmarks at 57 percent of sites" that frequently contained
several herbicides, including atrazine. 9 To top this off, agricultural
pollutants have adversely affected the water quality in the United
States to the point that many species of wildlife are suffering poten-

tially fatal ailments.9 0 Studies have discovered pesticides can cause
decreased hormonal levels in fish, developmental and reproductive
anomalies or death in amphibians, and fatalities in waterfowl.9 1
84. Id. at 5 (describing conclusions and findings of report).
85. Id. at 8 (showing strong need for concerted action in this area).
86. Adler, supra note 81, at 90 (discussing increase of chemicals for agricultural purposes).
87. ROBERT W. ADLER ET AL., THE CLEAN WATER ACT 20 YEARS LATER 177 (Island Press, 1993) (discussing extent of endangerment and extinction).
88. ROBERTJ. GILLIOM & PIXIE A. HAMILTON, U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR: U.S.
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, PESTICIDES IN THE NATION's STREAMS AND GROUND WATER,
1992-2001-A SUMMARY 2 (Mar. 2006), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2006/
3028/pdf/fs2006-3028.pdf ("Of the 178 streams sampled nationwide that have watersheds dominated by agricultural, urban, or mixed land uses, 56 percent had one
or more pesticides in [the] water that exceeded at least one aquatic-life
benchmark.").
89. Id. at 2 (discussing potential effects of pesticides on aquatic life and
wildlife).
90. ADLER, supra note 87, at 177 (stating "approximately thirty-seven percent
of the 436 species listed in the Endangered Species Information Database are endangered in part due to effects of irrigation and the use of pesticides").
91. Lal, supra note 3, at 455 (detailing that pesticides affect or damage gonadal development, fertilization, fecundity, and lower hormonal levels in Indian
fishes); Manosa, supra note 3, at 191 (finding herbicides cause loss in biodiversity
and greatly damage diving ducks and coot populations); Rouse, supra note 3, at
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C. The Effects of the Herbicide Atrazine on Wildlife
A diverse range of wildlife species suffer devastating, if not fatal, responses to herbicides and pesticides in their water sources.92
A prime example of this is the unprecedented rates of demasculinization in populations of amphibious wildlife linked to the herbicide atrazine.9 3 Atrazine is one of the most extensively used
pesticides both in the United States and throughout the world. 9 4
From 1993 to 1997, California used between 38,000 to 60,000
pounds of atrazine each year, and it has been detected in numerous
surface waters within the state. 95 This powerful herbicide, produced by Syngenta, is extremely effective in controlling weeds in
corn, sorghum, and sugarcane crops.9 6 Many in the scientific community, however, believe atrazine causes reproductive and developmental defects in wildlife and increases incidences of cancer in
humans exposed to the herbicide. 9 7 In 2003, the European Union
banned atrazine because it believed a ban on the herbicide was the
only way to prevent "ubiquitous and unpreventable water contamination."9 8 Yet, even in the wake of studies indicating hormonal impairment in wildlife and humans, the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) has refused to recognize the potential
detrimental effects of atrazine.9 9
799 (explaining finding that nitrogen concentrations near Great Lakes are enough
to cause death and developmental abnormalities in amphibians in addition to adversely affecting other animals in aquatic ecosystems).
92. For further discussion, see supra note 91 and accompanying text.
93. Hayes, supranote 1, at 4576 (discussing high rates of demasculinization in
amphibians).
94. Pesticide Atrazine Can Turn Male Frogs into Females, ScienceDaily (Mar. 1,
2010), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2010/03/100301151927.htm (noting extensive use of atrazine around world); see also Atrazine Updates, U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/reregistration/atrazine/atrazine
update.htm (last updated Nov. 17, 2011) (noting extensive use of atrazine in
United States).

95. DEREK W. GAMMON ET AL., MED. ToxiCOLOGY BRANCH CAL. DEP'T OF PESTICIDE REGULATION, CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ATRAZINE RISK CHARACTERIZATION
DOCUMENT 7, 15 (Aug. 15, 2001), available at http://www.cdpr.ca.gov/docs/risk/
rcd/atrazine.pdf (detailing atrazine use in California).
96. Atrazine Updates, supra note 94 (providing background on herbicide
atrazine).
97. J.B. Sass & A. Colangelo, European Union Bans Atrazine, While the United
States Negotiates Continued Use, 12 INT'LJ. OF OCCUPATIONAL & ENVTL. HEALTH 260,
261-62 (2006) (noting scientific concerns of potential human harm).
98. Id. at 260 (discussing European Union ban on atrazine).
99. Id. (discussing existence of evidence suggesting Syngenta made efforts to
influence EPA in atrazine assessment through private meetings and sponsoring
studies which concluded there were no harmful effects caused by atrazine on
humans or wildlife).
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In one study, scientists found that when they raised male African clawed frogs to sexual maturity, all of the male frogs not treated
with atrazine retained their male reproductive organs and traits. 0 0
Ten percent of the frogs treated with atrazine, however, displayed
female sexual organs and traits.10 1 In addition, males exposed to
atrazine had reduced testosterone levels and suffered significantly
decreased fertility rates. 102 Another study found American bullfrogs, northern leopard frogs, and wood frogs all exhibited deformed larvae and respiratory distress in response to increased
doses of atrazine. 0 3 Yet another study demonstrated that northern
leopard frog larvae exposed to atrazine during development often
suffered premature gonadal development. 10 4 Furthermore, when
atrazine was exposed to nitrate, a widely used agricultural nutrient,
the scientists observed drastic changes in the northern leopard frog
sex ratios.10
Entire amphibian populations face extinction due to reproduc-

tive failures, developmental mutations, and hermaphroaditism
caused by the runoff of agricultural pollutants into the waters they
depend on for survival.10 6 By disrupting the balance of the aquatic
ecosystem, agricultural pollutants pose substantial threats to the stability of these fragile systems and jeopardize the survival of an inesti07
mable number of species throughout the United States.

IV.

CLEAN WATER ACT

The objective of the CWA is to "restore and maintain the
chemical, physical and biological integrity of the Nation's wa100. Tyrone B. Hayes et al., Atrazine Induces Complete Feminizationand Chemical
Castration in Male African Clawed Frogs (Xenopus Laevis), 107 PROC. OF THE NAT'L
ACAD. OF SCIS. OF THE U.S. 4612, 4613 (Mar. 2010) (discussing atrazine exposure in
adult amphibians).
101. Id. at 4612 (discussing reproductive consequences of atrazine on African
clawed frogs).
102. Id. at 4614 (discussing additional reproductive consequences of
atrazine).
103. John W. Allran & William H. Karasov, Effects of Atrazine on Embiyos, Larvae,
and Adults of Anuran Amphibians, 20 ENvTx. TOXICOLOGY & CHEMISTRY 769, 772
(2001) (noting differences atrazine caused in subject species).
104. Orton, supra note 2, at 65 (analyzing effects of atrazine and sex ratios of
Northern Leopard Frog).
105. Id. (analyzing additional effects of atrazine and sex ratios of Northern
Leopard Frog).
106. For a discussion of the impact of agricultural pollutants on amphibians,
see supra notes 100-105 and accompanying text.
107. For a description of agricultural pollution's impact on fish and birds, see
supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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ters."' 08 While the CWA has made significant strides in improving
water quality through point source regulation, it has been ineffective in regulating nonpoint source pollution, the "largest remaining
threat to water quality and source of water quality impairments in
the nation." 0 9 Nonpoint and point source pollution differ in that
the former is the "runoff from broad sources such as fields" whereas
the latter is "emitted from discrete sources such as sewage pipes."11 0
Today, thirty years after the CWA was enacted, the United States is
still plagued with polluted waters that fail to meet the water quality
standards."' In 2004, after assessing the water quality in 16% of
the nation's streams, states reported that 44% of these waters were
impaired and failed to meet one or more of its designated uses.11 2
Of the 11.8 million lake acres, 30% were impaired for supporting
fish, shellfish, and wildlife, as were 36% of the 446,617 miles of assessed streams.' 13
In 2000, the National Water Quality Inventory reported "agricultural nonpoint source . . . pollution was the leading source of

water quality impacts on surveyed rivers and lakes, the second largest source of impairments to wetlands, and a major contributor to
contamination of surveyed estuaries and ground water." 114 Even
though the CWA is slowly expanding to regulate more agricultural
pollution through point source pollution permitting programs,
much of it remains unregulated as nonpoint source pollution.1 15
108. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (setting forth objectives of CWA and measures to
achieve those objective).
109. Nonpoint Source Program and Grants Guidelinesfor States and Teritories, 68
FED. REG. 60656 (Oct. 7, 2003) (noting continued threat of nonpoint source pollution in United States); seeJohnson, supra note 6, at 486 (recognizing nonpoint
pollution as being "primarily responsible for the failure in most states to meet the
Clean Water Act's water quality standards"); see also Zaring, supra note 7, at 515
(discussing ineffectiveness of CWA in addressing nonpoint source pollution).
110. Zaring, supra note 7, at 515 (explaining differences in pollution
discharges).
111. See Johnson, supra note 6, at 486 (describing failure of most states to
meet CWA water quality standards).
112. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, NATIONAL WATER QUALITY INVENTORY: REPORT TO CONGREss, 2004 REPORTING CYCLE: FINDINGS 9 (2009), http://water.epa.
gov/lawsregs/guidance/cwa/305b/upload/2009_05_20_305b_2004report report
2004pt3.pdf (reporting results of national water quality assessment).
113. NATIONAL WATER QUALrrY INVENTORY, sup-a note 112, at 10, 14 (noting
impairment of nation's lakes for designated use).
114. Agriculture, supra note 82 (discussing study on agricultural nonpoint
source pollutants in rivers, lakes, wetlands, estuaries, and ground water).
115. Both Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs) and certain agricultural equipment are considered point sources and require NPDES permits
under the CWA. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.23(a) (2006) (requiring CAFOs to have
NPDES permits); Concerned Area Residents for the Env't v. Southview Farm, 34
F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 1994) (recognizing manure spreading vehicles as point
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Nonpoint source pollutants from runoff typically include: "[e]xcess
fertilizers, herbicides and insecticides from agricultural lands ...
[s]ediment from improperly managed construction sites, crop and
forest lands and eroding streambanks, [s]alt from irrigation prac16
tices, [and] [b]acteria and nutrients from livestock."
In 1972, Congress attempted to address the agricultural problem by implementing § 208 of the CWA, which "directed states to
adopt area-wide waste treatment management plans.""' 7 However,
under § 208, the governor of each state was responsible for
designating areas with water quality control problems, the boundaries of that area, and a representative organization to develop an
effective area-wide waste treatment management plan.' 1 8 These
plans were to include "agriculturally and silviculturally related
nonpoint sources of pollution ... and their cumulative effects, runoff from manure disposal areas, and ... land used for livestock and
crop production," as well as "set forth procedures and methods (including land use requirements) to control to the extent feasible
such sources."' 1 9 After a great deal of time and money was spent in
developing the § 208 plans, few mandatory requirements were
adopted, which effectively made the plans voluntary.12 0 Nearly two
hundred § 208 plans were created, of which almost all were abandoned in the 1980s due to a lack of federal funding, inadequate
water quality data, poor EPA management, and a lack of public ed-

sources); see also Enforceable State Mechanisms for the Control of Nonpoint Source Water
Pollution,ENVrTL. LAw INST., ELI PROJ. No. 970300, 4 (1997) [hereinafter Enforceable
State Mechanisms], available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/NPS/elistudy/nonpoint.
pdf (examining state law enforcement mechanisms controlling nonpoint source
pollution). Nonpoint source pollution is not defined in the CWA, however, it is
often recognized as pollution which does not fall under the definition of a point
source in § 1362(14) of the CWA and it is often described as pollution coming
from a "diffuse source" associated with precipitation, rather than a point source,
which is then carried by runoff into lakes, rivers, wetlands, coastal areas, and
groundwaters. What is Nonpoint Source Pollution?, ENVrTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://
water.epa.gov/polwaste/nps/whatis.cfm (last updated Sept. 29, 2011).
116. What is Nonpoint Source Pollution?, supranote 115 (providing examples of
common nonpoint source pollutants).
117. Adler, supra note 81, at 78 (recalling 1972 Congressional attempt at addressing pollutant problems).
118. 33 U.S.C. § 1288(a)(1)-(2) (1972) (providing guidelines on how to identify and address water quality control problems).
119. 33 U.S.C. § 1288 (b) (2) (F) (i)-(ii) (providing guidelines on what needs to
be included in waste treatment management plans).
120. Adler, supra note 81, at 79 (noting § 208 did not include many
mandatory provisions); see Zaring, supra note 7, at 522 (describing practical effect
of § 208).
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1

ucation and awareness.121 States were also "unwilling to provoke
powerful agricultural constituencies" by creating strict regulations
when the government had not required them to do so. 122
Dissatisfied with the state of nonpoint pollution regulation,
Congress amended the CWA by adding § 319 to strengthen agricultural and runoff controls in 1987.123 This new nonpoint pollution
control provision stated "it is the national policy that programs for
the control of nonpoint sources of pollution be developed and implemented in an expeditious manner so as to enable the goals of
[the CWA] to be met through the control of both point and
nonpoint sources of pollution."12 4 In many respects § 319 is very
similar to § 208, as it too failed to significantly encourage the states
to develop more stringent assessments and plans.12 5 Section 319
required "states to complete comprehensive nonpoint source pollution assessments statewide, but where possible on a watershed basis;
and to prepare and implement comprehensive nonpoint source
pollution control plans to address the identified problems."1 26 By
way of § 319, Congress increased the substantive standard for runoff controls only slightly-raising the standard from "to the extent
feasible" in § 208 to "the maximum extent practicable" in § 319.127
In 1996, the EPA and the states agreed to address nine key
elements in an effort to upgrade the state nonpoint source management plans.' 2 8 These elements consisted of the following: creating
long- and short-term goals for restoring water quality, strengthening working partnerships, balancing approaches for state and watershed management, focusing on eliminating current water quality
impairment problems and preventing future ones, upgrading and
implementing all program requirements to be more flexible with
targeted approaches to control, and creating feedback loops for

121. Adler, supra note 81, at 184 (listing reasons behind abandonment of

§ 208 plans).
122. Zaring, supranote 7, at 524 (explaining state's rationale for not enacting
strict agricultural regulations).
123. Id. at 525 (asserting Congressional dissatisfaction with state if nonpoint
source regulation led to 1987 amendment of CWA).
124. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (7) (1987) (addressing need to implement new programs to address nonpoint source pollution).
125. Adler, supra note 81, at 80 (analyzing effect of § 319).
126. Id. (footnote omitted) (elaborating upon requirements of § 319).
127. Id. (comparing and quoting § 319 runoff control standard to § 208).
128. Nonpoint Source Programand Grants Guidelinesfor States and Tenitories,supra
note 109, at 60654 (describing further efforts to improve nonpoint source management plans).
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evaluation and revisions of the programs.12 9 These efforts, however, still inadequately incentivized the states to create more stringent pollution control programs.13 0
To add to these problems, there continued to be insufficient
funding, a lack of consequences for failure to comply with § 319,
and political pressure on state agencies to restrain from developing
nonpoint source pollution plans.13 1 Section 319 provides that if a
state failed or chose not to submit a nonpoint source monitoring
report, the responsibility simply shifted to the EPA without any consequences to the state.13 2 In addition, farmers had very little incentive to voluntarily participate in the plans; because they did not bear
the "total costs of off-farm pollution and erosion" there was no reason for them to change their practices. 3 s Finally, the states continued to find themselves faced with significant political and monetary
pressure from powerful agricultural interests if they choose to voluntarily regulate nonpoint source pollution.134
Section 303 of the CWA offers an additional means to address

nonpoint source pollution by requiring states set water quality standards for water bodies within the state and determine which of
those waters are impaired. 3 5 Impaired water bodies are then
placed on the § 303(d) list for which the state must create a Total
Maximum Daily Load (TMDL). 136 A TMDL is the "calculation [] of
129. The Virgin Islands Non Point Source Pollution Mgmt. Plan:Non Point Source: 9
Key Elements of an Effective TerritorialProgram, U.S. V.I. DEPT. OF PLANNING & NATURAL REs. (Jan. 10, 2000), http://www.dpnr.gov.vi/dep/FactSheets/nonpointelements.htm (listing key elements).
130. Zaring, supra note 7, at 527 (finding 1996 efforts insufficient incentive to
guarantee state action).
131. Id. (describing additional problems with implementing more stringent
pollution control programs).
132. Id. (explaining failure of § 319 to reduce nonpoint source pollution).
133. Id. at 528 (explaining failure of § 319 to reduce nonpoint source
pollution).
134. See BARBARA A. BARDES ET AL., AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS ToDAY: THE ESSENTIALs 2010-2011, 226 (Carolyn Merrill et al. eds., 2012-2012 ed.

2010) (explaining effect of agricultural interest groups on legislation). Even
though they "represent less than 1 percent of the U.S. population," farmers have
had a great deal of influence on legislation because they are "geographically dispersed and therefore have many representatives and senators to speak for them."
Id. See also Zaring, supra note 7, at 523-24 (noting voluntary nature of § 208). Zaring described the unbalanced competition between agricultural polluters and
other water users, noting agricultural interests "have a stronger incentive per person" to lobby for their interests than those who would only receive a small benefit
from nonpoint source regulation. Id. at 542.
135. 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (2006) (establishing water quality standards).
136. See Reed D. Benson, Pollution Without Solution: Flow Impairment Problems
Under Clean Water Act Section 303, 24 STAN. ENvrTL. L.J. 199, 218-19 (2005) (explain-

ing states' obligations under § 303).
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the maximum 'load' of a pollutant that a waterbody can receive
from all sources, including point, nonpoint, and background
sources, without exceeding the water quality standards for the pollutant."'3 7 Section 303 requires a state include water bodies that
are impaired solely due to nonpoint source pollution from agricultural runoff. 3 8
Because no authority exists to regulate these nonpoint source
polluters, however, the responsibility to develop TMDLs once again
falls into the hands of the state and local agencies subject to the
pressures of "politically powerful interests" concerned with TMDL
program costs.' 3 9 In effect, § 303 faces essentially the same
problems as §§ 208 and 319 in that it leaves regulation up to the
state to enforce, while simultaneously failing to set limits on
nonpoint source pollution.140
While many states have attempted to fill the gaps left by the
CWA's lack of sufficient legislation regulating nonpoint source pollution, most are unable to do so through the patchwork of laws they
have passed.' 4 1 The difficulty with these mechanisms is they vary
greatly by state, watershed, and activity, and therefore provide no
regional standard. 142 Additionally, the responsibilities of setting
and implementing the standards and enforcing the state laws are
often delegated to various groups that have no communication
method to ensure they can effectively address any problems that
may arise. 14 3 Therefore, it is necessary to find other avenues for the
public to ensure their interests in wildlife and water quality depen137. Meline MacCurdy, Private Landowners Granted Right to Challenge EPA's
Clean Water Act "Impaired Waters" Listing Decisions, MARTEN LAw (Mar. 3, 2011),
http://www.martenlaw.com/newsletter/20110303-impaired-waters-listing-decisions (defining "total maximum daily load" for purposes of § 303(d)).
138. Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123, 1140-41 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding
303(d) (1) listing and TMDL requirements include waters "impaired only by
nonpoint sources of pollution").
139. Benson, supra note 136, at 227 (analyzing source of controversy over
TMDL program).
140. See Endre Szalay, Comment, BreathingLife into the Dead Zone: Can the Federal Common Law of Nuisance Be Used to Control Nonpoint Source Water Pollution?, 85
TUL. L. REv. 215, 239 (2010) (criticizing voluntary nature of § 319).
141. These legal mechanisms may include general discharge provisions, erosion control, enforcement authorities, land use regulations, adopting accepted agricultural practice requirements, nutrient management plans, using BMPs as
enforcement mechanisms, and pesticide handling provisions. Enforceable State
Mechanisms, supra note 115, at 3749.
142. Id. at 54 (comparing states' primary responses to nonpoint source
pollution).
143. See id. at i (comparing states' primary responses to nonpoint source
pollution).
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dent public trust uses are protected from agricultural nonpoint
source pollution.

V.

THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AS AN ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF
ADDRESSING NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION

The shortcomings of

§ 319 have left the American public to

suffer the consequences of a nearly unregulated agricultural
nonpoint source water pollution predicament.144 Not only are the
effects of the pesticides, herbicides, fertilizers, and sediment taking
a toll on the quality of our nation's waters, they are also detrimental
to aquatic environments, biodiversity, and the wildlife which depend solely on these waters. 1 45
The topic of nonpoint source pollution regulation is politically
charged, often revolving around the potential costs incurred by the
polluters if more stringent standards are appropriately enforced. 146

In addition, the strength of the agricultural lobbying sector allows it
to place considerable pressure on legislators to prevent legislation
running counter to the interests of its constituents.14 7 With threats
of financial repercussions and political turmoil, states are often
forced to create toothless pollution control plans or, worse yet,
none at all.14 8 Fortunately, the judicial system, free from the confines of the special interest groups' excessive political pressure, is in
a prime position to protect the public's interests through the enforcement of pollution control plans.' 4 9 It is in this context the
public should use the public trust doctrine in wildlife, along with
the related public trust uses adversely affected by poor water quality, as a tool to pressure their state legislatures and agencies to uphold their duties to protect such interests when developing,
implementing, and reevaluating § 319 agricultural nonpoint source
pollution control plans.
144. Zaring, supra note 7, at 517 (discussing extent of nonpoint source pollu-

tion in surface and ground waters, significantly affecting water quality).
145. See discussion supra Part III.B-C.
146. See MARC 0. RIBAUDO ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIc., AER-782, EcONOMICs
OF WATER QUALITY PROTECTION FROM NONPOIr SOURCES: THEORY AND PRACTICE I

(1999), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/aer782/aer782.pdf (explaining negative consequences of stronger enforcement).
147. Zaring, supra note 7, at 515 (noting strength of agricultural interest

groups' influence on legislation); Bardes, supranote 134, at 226 (explaining effect
of agricultural interest groups on legislation).
148. See Zaring, supra note 7, at 523-24 (explaining weaknesses of § 208).
149. See Wood, supra note 30, at 75-77 (finding 'judicial branch remains the
ultimate guardian of the [public] trust").
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In California, state agencies must consider the public trust

when planning and allocating water resources in an effort to minimize harm to public interests. 150 Using this as a foundation, a litigant in California has several possible litigation strategies available
in which they can use the public trust doctrine as a means to control agricultural nonpoint source pollution. 15 1 For example, in an
effort to save a local population of American bullfrogs suffering
from reproductive and developmental defects and living in a river
containing high levels of atrazine, a member of the public could
bring a claim before the court under several potential causes of action.1 5 2 Assuming there is a § 319 nonpoint source pollution control plan developed by the Regional Water Quality Control Board
(RWQCB), the citizen could bring a claim against: (1) the RWQCB
for failing to consider the public's interest in protecting the American bullfrog population, which is dependent on this river, when
developing and implementing the regional water quality control
plan; (2) the RWQCB for failing to comply with state and federal
regulations regarding nonpoint source pollution; or (3) the permitting agency that granted a land use permit causing an increase in
the level of atrazine in the river through nonpoint agricultural runoff.15 8 In both the second and third claims, a citizen would raise
the public trust doctrine issue later in the proceeding as a means of
strengthening their argument. Any of these causes of action, however, would essentially pressure an agency to enforce an agricultural
nonpoint source control plan. While these are just a few of the
options available to California citizens, the list is not exclusive.1 54
As noted earlier, California has developed a common law system
best suited to apply the public trust doctrine in the manner proposed.1 55 Yet this does not prevent members of the public from

150.
712, 728
151.
152.

Nat'1 Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court of Alpine Cnty., 658 P.2d 709,
(Cal. 1983) (holding state has affirmative duty to consider public trust).
See infra text accompanying note 153.
See infra text accompanying note 153.

153. See generally J.M. GERSTEIN ET AL., UNIV. OF CAL. Div. OF AGRic. & NATURAL

RES.,

STATE AND FEDERAL APPROACH TO CONTROL OF NONPOINT SOURCES OF

(2006), available at http://ucanr.org/freepubs/docs/8203.pdf
(providing background information on California's Regional Water Quality Control Board (RWQCB), agency used as example in hypothetical).
154. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Grp., Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d
588, 600 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (holding private citizens have standing to bring
claim of harm to public trust).
155. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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attempting to enforce nonpoint source pollution control plans in
their states if the common law system allows for it. 156
When using the public trust doctrine to attack an agency's lack
of nonpoint source pollution management, citizens might face a
potential hindrance if the state agency only recognizes the public's
interest in wildlife resources to the minimum extent necessary
when reviewing or developing a nonpoint source pollution control
plan. As noted previously, however, a reviewing court would likely
regard the agency's decision with great skepticism and review it
with meaningful judicial scrutiny to ensure the agency acted reasonably as trustee of the public trust.1 57 In this situation, if the agency
failed to reasonably consider the public interest in their decision,
the court could simply ask the agency to reevaluate the plan.
When recognizing a public interest in wildlife and related
water quality dependent uses, an agency must address numerous
issues that may not lie solely within their control. Therefore, to ensure the public interests are properly considered, several different
agencies might need partner and work together to minimize agricultural nonpoint source pollution. The agencies involved could
include those managing wildlife resources, monitoring agricultural
nonpoint source pollution, and those who focus specifically on
water quality issues, all of which would need to join forces to efficiently address agricultural nonpoint source pollution. In such a
situation, there is tremendous potential for the individual agencies
to form partnerships and collaborate with other agencies in an effort to protect these public trust interests. Collaboration between
agencies will better protect the public interests and promote longterm relationships between the agencies, thus allowing them to
more effectively respond to a diverse range of environmental concerns by approaching the ecosystem as a whole rather than in fragmented sections.
156. Numerous courts have set a foundation for wildlife protection and water
quality through public trust uses even if not to the extent of California's common
law. See generally Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 387, 455 (1892) (noting
navigable waters and soils underneath them are held in public trust); In re Steuart
Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D. Va. 1980) (noting State of Virginia has
public trust interest in protecting wildlife for people); Kootenai Envtl. Alliance v.
Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1094-95 (Idaho 1983) (permitting public trust cause of action); Owsichek v. Alaska Guide Licensing & Control Bd., 763
P.2d 488, 491 (Alaska 1988) (permitting public trust claims).
157. See Sax, supra note 42, at 490 (noting courts will review "with considerable skepticism" governmental conduct affecting public resources); see also Wood,
supra note 30, at 75-77 (finding 'judicial branch remains the ultimate guardian of
the [public] trust").
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CONCLUSION

The CWA is known as the "most comprehensive federal regulatory program for controlling discharges to surface waters." 1 58 It
provided Americans with the rules and regulations necessary to
clean up many of the nation's waters so they could meet fishing and
swimming standards: a far cry from the water pollution issues that
plagued the country in the 1960s, such as the burning of the
Cuyahoga River. 15 9 Yet, even with these vast improvements, the
CWA still fails to adequately regulate agricultural nonpoint source
pollution.1 60
To address their concerns, the public should turn to the ancient public trust doctrine-a proven and powerful enforcement
mechanism available to the public with the potential to protect the
nation's wildlife and waters from agricultural nonpoint source pollution. The public trust doctrine is the ideal vehicle for citizens to
require state and local agencies to protect the public's interests in
wildlife and water quality dependent public trust uses when developing, regulating, and reevaluating nonpoint source pollution control plans under § 319 of the CWA.
158. ROBERT V.

PERCIVAL

&

CHRISTOPHER

H.

SCHROEDER, ENVIRONMENTAL

2009-2010, at 749
(Vicki Bean et al. eds., 2009) (providing overview of CWA).
159. See Cuyahoga Valley Water Quality, U.S. NAT'L PARK SERV. DEP'T OF THE
INTERIOR, http://www.nps.gov/cuva/naturescience/waterquality.htm (last visited
Dec. 20, 2011) (providing background on pollution in Cuyahoga River).
160. See Szalay, supra note 140, at 245 (comparing weaknesses of nonpoint
source pollution legislation compared to comprehensive legislation banning point
source pollution).
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